Hanlon Niemann Blog | A Freehold, New Jersey Law Firm

There’s Hope in Immunity

Fredrick P. Niemann, Esq., Business Litigation Attorney

Whether an employer-employee relationship ends on good terms or with acrimony, a common final act - the employee’s request for a reference for a new job - is increasingly leading to litigation.

From the former employer’s standpoint, it can be a case of damned if you do and damned if you don’t. A candid, negative response to the request can invite a suit by the former employee. A glowing recommendation that omits some serious shortcomings in the employee’s performance, or that declines to say anything about the employee except perhaps dates of employment, could result in litigation brought by the new employer, who would have preferred to be warned about a subpar employee. The prevalence of such disputes only figures to increase in the current economic downturn.

The growing dilemma is such that some employers are telling their employees from the outset that they will get no job reference - good, bad, or indifferent - when they leave. Under such a policy, inquiring prospective employers would get only the employment equivalent of “name, rank, and serial number.” Other employers are willing to give a reference, but only after they have in their files documents in which an employee consents to having prospective employers find out all there is to know, and waiving their right to sue over anything that is said in the reference.

The good news for businesses is that their exposure to liability to disgruntled former employees who requested references is constrained in most states by statute. These laws gen¬erally provide immunity to the givers of references, so long as their actions were not motivated by malice. Of course, former employees, perhaps hurting while in between jobs and inclined to blame former employers for their predicament, are quick to argue that a negative response to a reference request was malicious.

In one such case, a nurse sued her former supervisor for defamation when the supervisor responded to a request for a job reference by stating on a form, without elaboration, that the nurse had “unacceptable work practice habits.” A court ruled that the statement came within a statutory privilege or immunity for former employers’ communications to prospective employers concerning former employees, because it was information provided about a former employee’s work performance at the request of both the former employee and a placement agency.

Although the nurse made the general argument that the immunity was lost because the statement about her was made with malice, she was unable to back up that contention with factual evidence of ill will or spitefulness directed toward her. She argued, to no avail, that if the former employer considered her work habits to be acceptable enough not to fire her, then it was reasonable to infer that the later negative inference must have been motivated by malice.

For further information and advice in any business matter, do not hesitate to contact me at 732-863-9900 Ext. 101 or 105, or fniemann@hnlawfirm.com.

Businesses have been dependent on computerized information for some time now, but it has been only relatively recently that insurance companies have devised and offered insurance policies specifically tailored to the potential losses from a variety of problems that can affect a computer system.

An early impetus for cyber insurance was anticipation in the late 1990s of losses associated with the coming of “Y2K.” That concern turned out to be overblown, but the threats that have spurred cyber insurance offerings since then are real enough, including viruses, hackers, and legal injuries to others from information on a company’s website. One study has found that the average annual technology-related financial loss for United States companies more than doubled just from 2006 to 2007.

Another development that prompted more cyber insurance policies was the realization, which sometimes came as a surprise to insured businesses, that general liability policies did not cover computer problems. Cyber insurance is a good idea for all of the usual reasons associated with insuring against business losses. But it also makes sense because of the particular costs associated with responding to a computer data breach, especially now that many states have adopted data breach notification laws.

This kind of postmortem after a breach could include such measures as notifying affected customers, paying for credit monitoring for those customers, replacing compromised credit or debit cards, and undertaking forensic analyses of affected databases. All in all, there are some expensive scenarios to insure against.

Categories of Losses
The losses covered by cyber insurance generally fall into two categories: first-party losses, meaning those affecting the business itself; and third-party losses, meaning incidents mainly affecting outside parties, including the customers of a business. Of course, the same underlying problem can cause both kinds of losses, such as when unauthorized access to a computer system shuts down the computer system of a company whose customers or clients rely on that system through an extranet.

A comprehensive cyber insurance policy should encompass both kinds of risks. These are the typical categories of coverage:

• First-party business interruption, covering lost revenue experienced during downtime due to accidents or security breaches (but typically not losses due to catastrophic regional power outages);
• First-party electronic data damage, such as the compromise of data from a virus infection;
• First-party extortion, including the demands made by hackers;
• Third-party network security liability, arising from compromise and misuse of data stemming from identity theft and credit-card fraud;
• Third-party network liability in the form of court judgments obtained by persons harmed by problems originating with a business’s computer system; and
• Third-party media liability, aimed at the full range of potential liability from matter published in interactive online communications.

When an Internet executive held a meeting with the chairman of a tele-communications company, the agenda was a new business idea that the Internet executive had. The discussion was transformed into a recruitment when the telecommunications executive suggested that the idea should be pursued within the company he headed.

Much of the case focused on whether the handwritten agreement that started everything was a valid, binding contract.

For two men in the upper echelons of high-tech businesses, they then chose a decidedly low-tech way to memorialize their agreement. The end result, however, shows how substance can sometimes triumph over form in the law of contracts formation.

At the end of their meeting, the telecommunications executive simply wrote out the agreement by hand on two notebook pages, and both men signed it. The writing included specifics as to how the newly hired executive would be compensated, the terms on which he could quit if he became unhappy, and what would happen if intellectual property involved in the deal could not be transferred to the telecommunications firm. It also included the statement that “ [t]he parties will complete formal contracts as soon as possible but this is binding.” This would turn out to be pivotal language in the litigation that followed.

Unfortunately, the new arrangement quickly went downhill, and after about six months the new employee was fired. The relationship ended with the “formal contracts” never having been drafted and executed. When the former employee sued for breach of contract and other wrongs, more than six years of litigation ensued, with two trials and two appeals.

Much of the case focused on whether the handwritten agreement that started everything was a valid, binding contract. The telecommunications company argued that it was merely an “agreement to agree.”

However, a jury eventually ruled that the agreement was valid, and that the telecommunications firm had breached the terms of the contract represented by the two notebook pages.

Four factors are usually considered in determining whether a “preliminary agreement” is binding. In this case, the first two clearly favored the fired executive:  There was no explicit reservation of a right not to be bound (in fact, the handwritten agreement said the opposite) and the executive had partially performed the contract. The third factor is whether all of the terms of the alleged contract were agreed upon. On that point, the agreement, although it may have lacked some details, addressed all of the essentials for a binding contract.

The final factor is whether the agreement was a type of contract that is usually committed to writing in a formal manner. When millions are at stake, as was the case here, it may be unusual to seal the deal with a handwritten document, in outline form, and drafted on the spot by one of the principals without benefit of legal counsel.  The agreement was not much to look at, barely surpassing in formality the proverbial agreement scribbled on a cocktail napkin. Still, that it was unorthodox did not mean that the method was unprecedented. In the end, this factor, balanced against the other three, was not enough to discard the agreement and deprive the departed executive of the benefits of his bargain.

Justices place burden of proof on employers

The Supreme Court enhanced the ability of older workers to bring job discrimination claims, in a decision that comes as the nation’s workforce is aging and many companies are downsizing and lying off workers.

By a 7-1 vote, the court ruled that when a company asserts layoffs of older workers that were based on factors other than the worker’s age, the company has the burden of proving those factors are valid.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC), which handles age complaints, reports that age claims have increased steadily over the past decade.  About 19,000 are filed annually.

Lawyers who represent employees cheered the decision, as business groups termed it a disappointment.  “Any other result would have made it virtually impossible for employees to successfully challenge (seemingly) neutral corporate policies… such as reductions-in-force… that some employers have used to target older workers”, said Fredrick P. Niemann, Esq., an elder law attorney in Freehold, NJ.

Employers can defend themselves by showing that the lopsided impact was based on “reasonable factors” other than age, such as performance criteria or needed skills.  The question was whether the employer bears the burden of proving that a policy was based on such non-age factors, or whether it is up to the worker to prove the factors were illegitimate.

Who wins or loses often hangs on who has the burden of proof.

Thursday’s dispute traced to the mid-1990s and the end of the Cold War.  Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in Upstate New York, which had helped maintain nuclear-powered warships, was forced to scale back.  About 100 workers took a buyout offer, and 31 others were laid off.  Thirty of those laid off were at least 40 years old.  Clifford Meacham was among those who alleged that the layoffs were aimed at older employees.

Knolls had said they were based on objective factors such as performance, flexibility and critical skills.  Meacham won a jury verdict, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit eventually ruled Meacham had not proven that Knolls’ justification was invalid.

In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the high court reversed based on the standard of proof used.  He said the act’s text and structure put the burden of proof on employers.

“There is no denying that putting employers to the work of persuading (judges) that their choices are reasonable makes it harder and costlier to defend” various policies, Souter wrote.  He added, however, that Congress “set the balance where it is” and that those who object to that interpretation should take it up with Congress.

The court adopted the position of the EEOC, which had sided with Meacham.  Justice Clarence Thomas was the lone dissenter.  Thomas, who was chairman of the EEOC during the Reagan administration, said he did not think the law extends to coverage for policies that do not directly discriminate.

Justice Stephen Breyer took no part in the ruling.

To learn more about franchise agreements, click here.

Although the FTC-required disclosure documents are mandatory for first-time purchasers of a franchise, there are no required government disclosure documents that must be furnished to the buyer of an existing franchise business. The seller of the franchise is not required to provide the would-be buyer with the franchiser’s disclosure document.

You will want to very carefully study the terms of the existing franchise contract between the existing franchise and the franchiser. How long is its remaining term? Is the price reasonable? Will the operator compete with you afterwards? How does it compare with new franchises the franchiser sells to others? Will you be acceptable to the franchiser? Franchisers invariably have right to approve the transfer or sale of a franchise, or even to negotiate the right to buy back the franchise, and you don’t want to be a seller’s stalking horse.

An investment in a franchise is a substantial commitment of your money, your time, and your reputation. Our advice is to retain a lawyer to assist you in the process. It usually pays for itself many times over.

Business is a maze:  Let the experienced business law attorneys at Hanlon Niemann of Freehold, New Jersey guide you through the complexities of state and federal laws and regulations.

To learn more about franchise agreements, click here:

The franchise agreement is the cornerstone document of the franchisee–franchiser relationship. It is this document that is legally binding on both parties, laying out the rights and obligations of each. A sample agreement may either be attached to the disclosure statement or presented separately. Either way, you are entitled to receive it as a prospective franchisee five business days before signature. You should have it reviewed by a lawyer familiar with franchise matters–especially since most agreements are extremely one-sided in favor of the franchiser. No one should enter into a franchise and expect to have an evenly drawn contract.

The agreement will contain provisions covering, in considerable detail, the obligations of the franchiser (the company) and franchisee (you) regarding operating the business; the training and operational support the franchiser will provide (and at what cost); your territory and any exclusivity; the initial duration of the franchise and any renewal rights; how much you must invest; how you must deal with things such as trademarks, patents and signs; what royalties and service fees you will pay; tax issues; what happens if you should want to sell or transfer the franchise; advertising policies; franchisee termination issues; settlement of disputes; by the company, operating practices, cancellation, and attorney fees.

There is no standard form of franchise agreement because the terms, conditions, and the methods of operations of various franchises vary widely depending on the type of business involved. For example, franchises for printing, employment agencies, and automotive products will differ from the franchises for fast food service, convenience stores, or clothing.

New Jersey courts have long sought to protect the right and ability of a person “to pursue one’s own business, calling or occupation free from undue influence or molestation.”  In the latter part of the 19th century, the courts recognized that a “wrongful and malicious combination to ruin a man in his trade may be ground for [legal action].”  Similarly, in a line of cases spanning the middle of the 20th century, New Jersey courts protected the rights of real estate brokers whose clients surreptitiously cut them out of a transaction to avoid paying a brokerage commission.  The courts have continued their oversight of business dealings through the present, and now call this an action for tortuous interference.

Tortious Interference With Contract
There are two separate causes of action for tortuous interference:  tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.  The primary distinction between the two torts is the existence of a contract.  Each tort results from the need, or society’s desire, to protect certain types of business relationships.

To establish a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must prove: (1) actual interference with a contract; (2) that the interference was inflicted intentionally by a defendant who is not a party to the contract; (3) that the interference was without justification; and (4) that the interference caused damage.

To have acted “intentionally”, a client must have known of the contract,” but cannot have been a party to that contract.  Thus, this tort does not redress a breach of contract.  Rather, this tort addresses the separate injury caused by a third party inducing the breach.  Viewed from the perspective of plaintiff’s counsel, having a claim against party B for inducing that breach provides two potential pockets from which to recover.

The law governing this tort is relatively straightforward, inasmuch as the protected relationship between the parties is defined by contract.

Tortious Interference 
To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must prove: a reasonable expectation of advantage from a prospective contractual or economic relationship; that the defendant interfered with this advantage intentionally and with malice – that is, without justification or excuse; that the interference caused the loss of the expected advantage; and that the injury caused damage.

New Jersey’s emphasis on adequate proof of a reasonable probability of success is consistent with the national trend.  Summing up the standard for determining the existence of a reasonable expectation of economic advantage, one group of commentators has concluded:

[I]t is vital for the plaintiff – when pursuing a claim – to make certain that there is a bona fide and reasonable expectancy of a continuing and reasonable expectancy of a continuing and prosperous relationship, not just the mere desire or possibility for one.  In a prospective advantage case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that expected benefit with a reasonable degree of specificity.  More than a mere hope or optimism is needed; although the law does not require reasonable probability of economic benefit from a valid prospective relationship.

Malice
New Jersey courts describe malice in a variety of ways.  First, the courts make clear that malice does not mean ill will.  Rather, malice means that the conduct was engaged in without justification or excuse.  In the typical business case, competition between the parties may constitute justification.  The courts, however, require more than the assertion of competition:  A defendant must have a legitimate motive, such as success in the marketplace, and employ legitimate means to obtain that goal.

In Ideal Dairy, the Appellate Division specifically addressed proof of malice when competition is invoked as a justification.  The Ideal Dairy court held that there was nothing wrong with targeting a competitor, and that targeting a competitor by offering lower prices was, in fact, “the very essence of competition.”

New Jersey case law does not permit a competitor to use wrongful means.  New Jersey courts use the term “malice” to describe conduct that is “injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards of common morality or of law.”

The New Jersey courts have reduced this inquiry to whether the conduct was sanctioned by the “rules of the game.”  The rules of the game standard first appeared in 1957 in DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, and has become the standard for determining malice in tortious interference cases.  The DiCristofaro court found that a cause of action might lie based on allegations that the defendant cemetery owners imposed excessive charges and costs upon patrons who obtained monuments and memorials from someone other than the cemetery when, as a result, the outside company was prevented from realizing its “normal business expectancies.”

The tort of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage requires that business competitors act within the moral and ethical framework required by society, as well as their own industry.  The rules of the game depend on the customs, practices or code of ethics of the industry, which have typically been vetted time and again by what is necessary to achieve efficiency in the marketplace.

New Jersey courts, harkening back to the advice dispensed by all mothers in our society that “just because someone else is doing it doesn’t make it right,” require that conduct during the course of competition must not only be consistent with the rules of the game, it also must not be “fraudulent, dishonest, or illegal.”

The New Jersey courts have enumerated several examples of what may constitute fraudulent, dishonest or illegal conduct, but the list is by no means exhaustive.  For example, liability will ensue where a competitor uses “violence, fraud, intimidation, misrepresentation, criminal or cruel threats, and/or violations of the law.”  Moreover, the conduct complained of must be independently actionable.  For example, one of the issues analyzed by the Appellate Division in Ideal Dairy was whether the defendant had violated the antitrust laws through the use of extremely low pricing.

The Ideal Dairy court held that, absent a violation of the antitrust laws, a claim of tortious interference could not be premised on “extremely low, or unprofitable prices” because that conduct was not independently actionable.”

Conclusion
The painful irony is that you may not have done anything wrong, and may have been engaging in intense, but legitimate, competition in the marketplace, but you may, nonetheless, have to endure months of expensive discovery to prove that this conduct does not subject him/her to liability so goes the capitalist way.